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Chapter 4 The Green Movement 
 
I argued in chapter 1 that environmentalism brings insights to the study of society. It shows the 
need for basic archaeological work on sociology, in particular the bringing of nature into the range 
of factors relevant to social analysis. I showed in chapter 2, conversely, that sociology can also 
bring its wisdom to green searches for social and political solutions to environmental problems. I 
will focus in this chapter on another perspective that sociology can bring to environmentalism. 
Sociologists can also use their longstanding expertise explain the rising and waning of 
environmentalism as a value system and social movement. However, even though this is the sort 
of thing that sociologists are used to doing, it still requires them to restructure the way they look at 
the world to get a full and adequate understanding of the rise of environmentalism. 
 
I will first discuss general explanations of social movement activity and, then, more particularly 
'new' social movements of which the green movement is one. We will then be able to look at 
explanations for the rise of the green movement specifically in the 1970s and 1980s 
 
How do social movements develop? 
 
A social movement can be defined as a collective attempt to further a common interest or goal 
through collective action outside established institutions. There are three key points to draw out 
here. First, the movement is collective: it involves a collective interest or goal and collective action 
in pursuit of it. Second, it is based on a shared interest or goal. Third, it pursues change outside 
established institutions, so differing from a political party. 
 
Different sorts of general explanation of how collective action or social movements develop 
emphasize different foci of causality. Sociological explanations often emphasize social or cultural 
change in society as the basis for movement activity. Political explanations may focus on the 
character of political institutions or the capacity of social movements to organize politically. 
 
(1) Structural theories (shown in column 1 of table 4. 1) emphasize the development of collective 
action or social movements as resulting from changing economic or social structures. On changing 
economic structure, the shift from pre-industrial to capitalist modes of production can be seen as 
having led to the growth of the factory system and urbanization and the accentuation of the 
division between capital and labour, all of which facilitated the formation and organization of the 
labour movement. The shift from liberal to late capitalism can be seen as precipitating the rise of 
social movements opposed to bureaucratic expertise and centralized corporate and state power. 
Similarly, the putative subsequent shift from organized to disorganized capitalism could be seen 
as leading to the breakdown of traditional class solidarity and a move to more plural and diverse 
political identifications and foci of conflict.  On changing social structure, new social groupings, 
such as the industrial working class with the rise of capitalism and more recently the unemployed 
and new middle class, could be seen as susceptible to new ideological orientations and political 
values and facilitative of social movements. Structural explanations of social movement ideology 
rather than of the rise of social movements as movements may emphasize it as being geared 
around opposition to prevailing economic structures or contradictory social groupings. 
 
Table 4.1 Explanations for social movements 
 
 Sociological   Political  
 1 Structural 2 Cultural 3 Political  4 Action 
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(2) Cultural explanations (shown in column 2 of table 4.1) focus on cultural shifts and value 
changes in society. A typical example might be the post-materialist thesis discussed later in this 
chapter. This sees increasing standards of living and material satisfactions as leading to greater 
concern with non-material values. The decline of deference and liberation from previous social 
mores in the 1960s might be seen as other examples favouring the alternative social movements 
which grew at the time. Davies (1962) emphasizes the significance cultural mood of rising 
expectations. He argues that political change is less likely to be caused by material immiseration, 
as is often posed. Poverty and deprivation have more to do with resignation despair than 
revolution. Change is more likely to come out of rising expectations fuelled by increasing 
standards of living. This explanation fits well with the situation of post-war rising standards of living 
in the developed world. Cultural explanations of social movement ideology, meanwhile, may 
emphasize opposition to prevailing cultural norms or the promotion of alternative cultural values or 
lifestyles 
 
(3) Political explanations (shown in column 3 of table 4.1) may see the openness of political 
institutions as facilitating and encouraging movement activity in society. Alternatively they may see 
traditional political institutions as failing to incorporate the demands and desires of particular 
collectivities in society. Collective agents, frustrated 
by their lack of access to established institutions, then resort to social movement activity outside 
them. Their aims may be geared around obtaining political representation or integration (see Scott 
1990: esp ch. 6). This may apply to any number of social movements – the labour, women's, 
peace or green movements, for example. Tilly (1978), for example, has a historically and culturally 
relative conception of the development of collective action. He stresses the significance of access 
to institutionalized means of representation and the response of authorities to collective action in 
determining what direction that action takes, particularly with respect to whether it turns violent or 
not. Social movements, for him, are a means of mobilizing group resources when the 
institutionalized means of representation are closed off and groups' demands are politically 
repressed. Smelser (1963), on the other hand, sees structural conduciveness in the form of open 
political institutions as a condition for facilitating social movement activity. 
 
(4) Action explanations, meanwhile, (shown in column 4 of table 4.1) react against the 
determinism of other explanations and attempt t, restore power to social movements themselves. 
They stress that the development of a social movement is at least in part a function of its capacity 
to organize, mobilize and secure cohesion in pursuit of its objectives. Touraine (1981), for 
example, stresses processes of activism and achievement in the development of social 
movements. His concept of 'historicity' is intended to encapsulate the centrality of collective actors' 
development of knowledge of a situation in reshaping their place in it. Touraine takes a special 
interest in the objectives of social movements and the strategies they develop in fields of action 
where they are ranged against opposing forces. In other words social movements are not just an 
effect of structural, cultural or political change but a proactive force in themselves defining and 
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shaping the path of formation they take. Tilly (1978) who, as we saw above, takes a conjuctural 
and contingent view of social movement formation, also stresses the organization of a group, its 
success in mobilizing resources, be they material or popular support, and its cohesion on common 
interests, objectives and tactics. In other words, processes of group mobilization are as important 
as underlying shifts in economic, cultural or political patterns in determining the activity of social 
movements. 
 
I will use this fourfold typology I have discussed to break up explanations of the rise of 
environmentalism below, focusing on political, action, cultural and structural explanations in turn. 
There are, of course, theories which could accommodate a number of these explanations in 
combination. Smelser (1963), for example, specifies six conditions for the development of 
collective action. Smelser's theory, set out in figure 4.1, is far from faultless, but it shows how a 
combination of the sorts of factors mentioned above, rather than any one in isolation, can 
contribute to the development of social movement activity. In his conditions 1 and 2, for example, 
Smelser draws attention to political and structural factors in social movement formation. In 3 he 
highlights cultural and ideological factors and in 5 and 6 action inputs. In 4 he lights the role of 
proximate conjunctural circumstances. 
 
Figure 4.1 Smelser’s six conditions for collective action 
 
1 Structural conduciveness, e.g. political openness  
2 Structural strain, e.g. societal conflicts  
3 Generalized beliefs, e.g. shared ideas on grievances and action  
4 Precipitating factors, e.g. events triggering action  
5 Co-ordination of group, e.g. leadership, communication, resources  
6 Authorities' social control, e.g. ameliorative or coercive response of authorities  
 
 
A 'new' social movement? 
 
The categories set out in table 4.1 give us general frames within which the development of social 
movement activity can be made seen. There are, however, more particular accounts which try to 
specify what is new about social movements which have emerged in recent years (since the 
1960s in particular) and are seen as novel and different from old social movements. The new 
social movements are said to include the green, women's, peace and civil rights movements all, 
contrasted with older social movements such as the labour and union or workers' movement.  
 
As can be seen from table 4.2 the main basis on which old new social movements are often 
distinguished is that old social ovements are seen as being state-oriented and new social 
movements civil society-oriented. (1) Location: old social movements tend to be located in the 
polity in political parties (Labour and Social Democratic Parties, for instance), whereas the new 
social movements are autonomous movements outside conventional political institutions. (2) Aims: 
the aims of old social movements are to secure political representation, legislative political reform 
and rights associated with citizenship in the political community; the new social movements, 
however, want to defend civil society against political power and redefine culture and lifestyle in 
civil society rather than pursuing legislative change through the state. (3) Organization: social 
movements adhere to formal and hierarchical modes of internal movement organization whereas 
the new social movements go for informal or unstructured organization or 'networks' built up from 
grass-roots participation rather than structures of authority. (4) Medium of change: the old social 
movements are oriented towards political institutions through which change can be achieved. The 
new social movements go for newer and more innovative forms of direct action and work on 





Table 4.2 New and old social movements 
 
Old social movements  New social movements 
 
Location   Polity   Civil society 
 
Ideology and aims  Political integration  Autonomy civil society 
Economic rights  New values/lifestyle, 
 
Organization of  Formal and   Informal network  
movement   hierarchical   grass roots 
 
Medium of change  Participation in  Direct action and 
political institutions  cultural politics  
 
 
Is the green movement 'new'? It has many features which fit the ‘new' mould. Fierce debates have 
raged in the movement about the usefulness of participation in the political sphere and the pursuit 
of change through political institutions. Many greens prefer grass-roots based decentralized forms 
of participation or lifestyle politics through green consumerism or communes. Many have argued 
that political legislation is inadequate without widespread change in our acquisitive value systems 
and ways of living. This involves changes in modes of consciousness in civil society rather than 
the passing of new laws through the state. Furthermore, some organizations in the green 
movement certainly are keen to pursue non-hierarchical forms of political organization in their own 
movement, playing down the role of leaders with arrangements such as shared spokespeople and 
the rotation of personnel in office. 
 
There are however also some features of the old social movements in the green movement. Many 
environmental organizations are concerned to get politicians to do things to remedy degradation. 
Green parties have sprung up throughout the developed world aimed at getting into political power 
even if only through coalitional alliances or at non-national levels. While many greens want to 
pursue radical democratic forms of internal movement organization this has not been a one-way 
battle. They have come up against so-called 'realists' who see formal leadership structures and 
hierarchies as the most effective way to pursue political change through conventional institutions. 
Furthermore, many more 'old-fashioned' environmental organizations adhere to standard 
conventional 'old' forms of hierarchy and membership participation. 
 
Why does such a contradictory picture emerge? There are a number of points which can be made 
about the general attempt to apply the new/old dichotomy to social movements and there are 
some things about the green movement itself which make it difficult to fit it into these parameters. 
Scott (1990) argues that the old/new dichotomy involves an ahistorical categorization which reifies 
the initial formation stage when analysing the new social movements failing to see that old social 
movements started off from civil society beginnings and evolved into political entities. The current 
new movements may do the same under pressure from political reality and the necessity of 
achieving their objectives. Furthermore, the so-called new social movements are not so 
exclusively civil society contained as suggested by the 'new' category, often being concerned also 
with legislative reform and political access. 
 
In addition to the formation of green parties and environmental lobbying of politicians in pursuit of 
legislative change, think also of women's movements, campaigns for abortion rights, sex 
discrimination legislation, changes in rape laws and fair political representation. Finally, there is 
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much variation among the new social movements between new and old forms of internal 
organization, and progression among some, green organizations included, towards more formal 
political structures. In many cases it is only the radicals and fundamentalists within the green 
movement who fit the 'new' bill well enough. This is not least the case for the diverse green 
movement from the National Trust and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds through 
Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace to Earth First, there is quite a mix between and within 
groups which make it difficult to classify the whole movement, let alone single groups within it like 
Greenpeace, into a new or old dichotomy. 
 
Crook et al. (1992: 151, 162) deal with this question by breaking new social movements into three 
main components: value content, socio-cultural basis and organizational form. On value content 
they suggest that appealing to universal values and principles, as the new movements do, is 
nothing new. Such appeals are typical of modern Enlightenment ideas. On organizational form 
they suggest that the new social movements may well 'normalize' to more institutionalized and 
conventional forms in accordance with cycles of social movement formation of the sort highlighted 
by Scott. But they argue that such movements are 'new' in terms of their socio-cultural bases, 
breaking radically with old social movements in the shift from class and economic interest to 
socio-cultural and value bases. 
 
Crook et al. may underestimate the value-content novelty of feminist and green inclusions of the 
private sphere and non-human interests in political theory. There may be new dimensions to new 
social movements in this respect as well as in their socio-cultural bases. But many features of new 
social movements in general and he green movement in particular are either conventional in 
internal organization and political in orientation or are becoming more over time.  
 
Let me turn now to explanations for the recent rise in popularity of environmentalist values and 
politics. I will look at: (1) political explanations based on institutions of interest intermediation; (2) 
action explanations based on the role of environmental groups, the media and science in 
articulating environmental problems as issues; (3) cultural explanations such as the 
post-materialist thesis; (4) structural explanations based on changes in economic structure and the 
rise of social groupings such as the 'new middle class; and finally (5) environmental explanations 
which focus on objective environmental problems themselves. With the exception of the last, these 
fit into the categories of general social movement explanation outlined in table 4.1 above. 
 
Political explanations: the failure of political institutions 
 
A first set of explanations for the rise of the environmental movement suggests that environmental 
demands become channeled into social movement form because of their exclusion from 
conventional political channels (such as parliament, traditional political parties, corporatist forums 
or the media). The focus of explanation is on the closure of established political institutions to 
environmental concerns. Social movements are seen as arising out of groups or demands which 
have to find alternative channels of expression. These they find in social movement activity in civil 
society or in organized participation in alternative parties in parliamentary forums. In other words 
one reason for the rise of environmental movements and parties is the exclusion of environmental 
issues from conventional politics and their channeling into alternative forms.  
 
Two dimensions to this question can be highlighted here. First particular groups are excluded from 
political institutions and try to find other channels of expression. Second, this is the case for 
particular ideas or demands. I will use this distinction in my discussion below but, in the case of 
environmentalism, groups which support environmentalist demands and these demands 
themselves both seem to be excluded. 
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Scott (1990:143-7) argues that it is significant that environmental movements have become 
particularly prominent in countries like Sweden, Austria and the former West Germany which have 
had a strong role for corporatist arrangements of a narrow and exclusive sort. Corporatism 
involves the formation of a united body, acting as one, out of the bringing together of different 
individuals or groups. In politics the term usually refers to government by a partnership of 
governing politicians, business and labour. In such arrangements usually only a selective range of 
political actors (normally organised labour, government and employers) are included. 
Environmental concerns tend to be excluded from the deliberations of these actors in such forums. 
Formal democratic arenas (parliaments and political parties) where environmental concerns might 
be able to get access are circumvented by corporatist partners who take the major decisions 
outside them. Environmental social movements and parties are more likely to be formed in 
circumstances such as these where environmental concerns are excluded from mainstream 
politics. 
 
Why are environmental issues excluded from corporatist processes and channeled into social 
movement form? Taking the distinction made above, the explanation can be broken down into 
reasons which focus first on the main social groups involved in environment. activity and second 
on the ideas of environmentalism. 
 
First, the main group often said to be most concerned about the environment is the 'new middle 
class' - white collar professionals who work in the non-productive public sector, in education, 
health welfare for example. Members of this group are highly educated but at  the poorer and 
more disenfranchized end of the middle class (Scott, 1990:138-9). Corporatist arrangements 
incorporate a number of groups - the organized working class, private business and government - 
but noticeably not the new middle class. Feeling excluded from mainstream politics, the new 
middle class are more likely to channel their energies into social movement activity or alternative 
parties than corporatist forums or the sort of parties that participate in them. They are particularly 
frustrated by the coincidence of political exclusion with their relatively high level of cultural and 
educational assets. Their educational privileges and articulacy clash with their relative economic 
disadvantage and political exclusion, leading to frustration and ferment channeled through 
alternatives to main institutions, 
 
The second dimension of the exclusion of environmental concerns from corporatist arrangements 
moves on from the social base environmentalist movements to their ideas. Environmentalist ideas 
are perhaps most prominent in the emphasis they give to questioning industrialism, economic 
growth and technocratic scientific rationality. These, however, are the very values corporatist 
actors are most committed to sustaining and pursuing with ever greater efficiency and success. 
The industrial working class, private business and government are all committed to economic and 
industrial growth to provide jobs for workers, business profits and a sound economic base 
financing government expenditure and securing electoral success. In other words, not only is the 
main social group associated with environmentalism excluded from corporatist arrangements but 
the ideas of environmentalists could hardly be more at odds with the ideologies of the partners 
involved in such arrangements and so are likely to get short shrift from them (Scott 1990:146). 
 
The rise of the green and other new social movement ideas can also be seen as a political as well 
as environmental reaction against corporatist-bureaucratic government. In Western Europe 
corporatist settlements were set up in the twentieth century to incorporate politically capital and 
labour and to undermine class conflict. However, corporatism has often been a form of elite 
politics that involves the participation only of the leaders of these classes and the marginalization 
of other interest groups. New social movements are seen as a response to social and political 
exclusion. According to corporatist closure theory they are an attempt to gain access for excluded 
groups and issues but also to propose anti-exclusive and anti-centralist political organization. They 
propose civil society initiatives, inclusive participation, autonomy, decentralization and universal as 
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against sectional values and try to implement these in their own internal structures. Social 
movements have served similar functions in Eastern bloc communist regimes where they provided 
a form through which citizens could oppose centralized regimes.  
 
If the corporatist closure explanation is correct, it may show why environmentalist activity has been 
less radical and oppositional in the USA and more oriented to mainstream political institutions. 
USA politics have been less bureaucratic, centralized and corporatist and more focused on 
processes like lobbying, constitutional interpretation and litigation, which are more open to 
movements and interest groups. This is not to say that such groups do not require resources to 
pursue their demands or that such resources are distributed equally (see Dahl 1985). But the 
political system is sometimes supposed to be more open than in corporatist countries and this may 
explain the lesser degree of oppositional anti-politics radicalism among the US ecological, civil 
rights, peace and women's movements (see Crook et al. 1992:137, 159; Lowe and Rudig 
1986:528). Corporatist closure may also help to explain why the radical green movement has been 
less prominent in civil society social movement activity in Britain than elsewhere in Western 
Europe. Britain has a public inquiry system which can process ecological demands, integrate them 
into the political system and minimize radicalization of the movement arising out of exclusion and 
marginalization (see Lowe and Rudig 1986:536). 
 
There are, however, limitations to political explanations for the rise of environmentalist movements 
based on the closure of established institutions. There are four points: the first relates to forms of 
political exclusion other than corporatism; the second to the role of institutional openness as well 
as closure in fostering the growth of environmental movements and parties; the third to the role of 
corporatist closure in inhibiting rather than fostering movement activity; the fourth to the inability of 
political exclusion explanations to explain the rise of environmental concern in the first place. 
 
The first point is that corporatism does not have a monopoly on political exclusion. The 
first-past-the-post electoral system, for example, under which it is difficult for small parties to get 
representation proportion to their support, has excluded the Green Party, and so green issues, 
from the political agenda in Britain (Dijkink and der Wusten 1992). 
 
Furthermore, there may be cultural or electoralist as well as institutional reasons for the exclusion 
of environmental issues from mainstream political concern. Parliaments as well as corporatist 
forums may exclude such concerns from their agendas. Politicians may, for instance, perceive that 
environmental issues are not important, are subservient to greater goals such as economic growth 
or are electorally viable enough for them to pursue. In other words, if exclusion of environmental 
issues from the mainstream political agenda is a factor in the rise of environmental movements 
and parties, this may be due to reasons other than, or in addition to, the presence of corporatist 
institutions. 
 
A second issue is raised by the question of electoral systems mentioned above. One reason why 
the green movement may have been less successful politically and culturally in Britain could be 
due to nature of the electoral system which excludes small parties and prevented the Green Party 
from getting a foothold in political institutions and access to a public profile. In fact it could be 
argued that political openness through proportional representation (PR) rather than, or as well as, 
corporatist political closure has been a factor in the success of the green movement in corporatist 
countries (Scott 1990: 147-8). This would fit with Smelser's (1963) stress on structural 
conduciveness and political openness as facilitating the formation of collective action. In the 
former West Germany, for example, world's most famous green party - Die Grünen - benefited 
ffrom the party list system in which a party gaining 5% of the vote is entitled to parliamentary 
representation. Not only does this give small parties in parliament national prominence but they 
also become eligible for financial support (Yearley 1991:88-9). Political openness then, could be 
an explanation for the rise of the green movement corporatist countries. 
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A third problem is that it seems plausible to suggest that corporatist closure could lead to the 
pursuit of environmental objectives through parliamentary channels rather than alternative social 
movements. Environmental legislation could be passed through parliament using the space left by 
the hiving off of major decision-making into corporatist forums. Corporatist closure, far from 
enabling social movement activity, could disarm it by leaving space for mainstream parliamentary 
participation. Fourth, political exclusion explanations in general do not explain the rise of concern 
for environmental problems. They only explain why that concern, once it exists, becomes 
channeled into social movement activity or green parties rather than through established political 
institutions. Other explanations are needed to explain why environmental concern arises in the first 
place. These may be provided by action, cultural, structural or environmental explanations of the 
sort  will discuss in the rest of this chapter. 
 
Action explanations: environmental groups, the media and science 
 
First let me look at action explanations for the rise of environmentalism. These suggest that 
environmental concern and the green movement are not simply products of political, economic, 
social or cultural structures but that they are articulated and popularized by social and political 
actors in the media, science and environmental groups. The emphasis here is on action rather 
than structure and subjective agency rather than external determination. 
 
1 Environmental groups. Some analysts are interested in the political articulation of green issues 
by pressure groups and political parties and the mobilization of public opinion behind them in 
pursuit of political change (see Lowe and Goyder 1983; Spretnak and Capra 1986). 
 
Yearley (1991: chs 2 and 3) takes a 'social problems' perspective on the rise of environmentalism, 
focusing on the definition and articulation of environmental problems by social actors rather than 
their objective existence as such. The objective existence of environmental problems themselves 
is not enough to give rise to environmental awareness and concern. Explaining the work of Kituse 
and Spector (1981) Yearley argues that: 
 
‘the mere fact that there were objective circumstances which constituted a 
potential problem was not enough for a 'social problem' to emerge . . .  
sociologists concerned with social problems should suspend any interest in  whether 
the objective circumstances merit the existence of a social problem or not ... they 
should focus on the social processes involved in bringing an issue to public attention 




‘it might be tempting to argue that the objective problem has finally found its way into 
the public consciousness. The social problems perspective prevents us from falling 
into that way of rewriting history’. (p. 52) 
 
The 'correctness of social problems claims' is, for social problems analysts, Yearley argues, 
'comparatively unimportant' (p. 115).  
 
He argues that the rise in the public prominence of green concerns in Britain has been the product 
of the moral entrepreneurship of organizations like the Royal Society for Nature Conservation, the 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds and Greenpeace.  These define and shape certain 
environmental phenomena as problems using campaigns, the media and politicians and mobilizing 
sections of the public behind their social problem claims. Environmental problems do not become 
such by virtue simply of their objective existence; they do not become environmental problems 
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until they are defined as such. And this definition and its popularization is engineered and shaped 
by pressure groups and the environmental lobby.  
 
Eyerman and Jamison (1991; Jamison et al. 1990) also propose an action perspective which, 
while recognizing the role of external political and historical circumstances, stresses the active role 
of movement personnel. In particular they emphasize the creative role of ideas and and cognition 
in social movements - what they call 'cognitive praxis’. They argue that social movements 
developed in the latter two of the three countries they looked at - Sweden, Denmark and the 
Netherlands - when three types of knowledge - cosmological, technological and organizational - 
were combined by environmental activists. The cosmological dimension involves the translation of 
scientific ecology and analyses of natural processes into a social political philosophy, as in the 
burst of political ecology publications in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The technological 
dimension involves ideas about technological processes involved in environmental despoliation 
and the conceptualization of alternative technologies. The organizational dimension involves the 
identification of radical participatory democracy as a desirable goal. When combined, these three 
dimensions made environmentalism into a social movement. This being so, Eyerman and Jamison 
emphasize, like Touraine, (1981), action and knowledge and the role of movement actors and 
intellectuals rather than just the external material structural determination of movement fortunes by 
economic, social or cultural change. 
 
Yet it is important to note that political activity cannot alone or in all cases account for the rise of 
environmental concern. Dijkink and van der Wusten (1992), for example, suggest that there is a 
high level of environmental concern in countries like Spain and Italy without strong environmental 
groups there. Let me move on to other 'action' explanations. 
 
2 The media. Yearley identifies a key actor in the definition, articulation and popularization of 
environmental problems as the media. The environmental organizations he looks at, Greenpeace 
in particular, are shrewd and skilful in their use of the media, designing their campaign activities to 
be visual, dramatic and easily presentable by the media and especially TV. 
 
Other analysts draw attention to the emphasis on cultural symbols, icons and images, rather than 
discursive arguments, in new social movement activity. This makes them especially accessible to 
the media. New social movements, it is argued, are not directly political in the sense of trying 
especially to obtain administrative or legislative decisions. They are concerned as much to present 
symbols which challenge dominant cultural codes (Feher and Heller 1983; Melucci 1989). The 
symbols and language of new social movements are critical, oppositional and adversarial, vague 
yet simple and compact, visible and didactic. They include signs, badges, banners, chants and 
utterances calling for 'stops' or 'bans' and warning of danger. Symbols include clothes, taste, 
behaviour and diet - in short, lifestyle. Demonstrations of meaning are public and visual: marches. 
rallies, sit-ins, festivals, performances and so on. Furthermore, the presentation of cultural 
meaning by new social movements is often the substance and end of their activity as much as the 
form for presenting a case or the means for achieving another end. Social movement activity is 
about the very living and expression of alternative meaning. All this is unusual, visual and suitable 
for media, especially television presentation, and access to the media is central to the articulation 
and publicizing of environmental problems and the mobilization of concern and movement activity 
(Crook et al. 1992:154-7). 
 
3 Science. Scientists are another group who could be added to environmental groups and the 
media as central to the turning of objective environmental phenomena into environmental 
problems and arousing green concern and political activity. 
 
Yearley (1991:ch. 4), however, suggests that science is an unreliable and insufficient friend to the 
environment. There are a number of reasons for this. (1) Many environmental problems are based 
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in  scientific and technological developments, e.g. CFCS, nuclear power, motor vehicles etc. (2) 
Many scientists actually line up on the side of industry against the environmentalist lobby. On 
issues such as food safety, toxic waste and nuclear power, scientists are as often to be seen 
opposed to the green movement as in support. Many greens take arguments (1) and (2) further. 
They argue science is part of the ideology of industrialism and that modern science has an 
exploitative view of nature concerned with its instrumental use for human ends and its 
manipulation, domination and control. Enlightenment rationality, it is argued, needs to be replaced 
by a new science which is holistic and more sensitive to nature. (3) Scientific knowledge is 
sometimes incorrect or incomplete. Scientists sometimes have to revoke previous claims or do not 
have sufficient knowledge to make judgments on all environmental issues because of, say, lack of 
resources, insufficient information or the complexity or unobservability of ecological phenomena. 
In these respects, scientists are 'a poor ally to environmentalists' (p. 129). (4) Scientific 
observations are open to different interpretations and scientific knowledge cannot make 
epistemological claims of certainty. (5) As well as being unreliable in these senses, science is also 
insufficient because making judgments about which parts of the environment need protection 
involves moral rather than scientific issues and deciding on policy must be based on practical and 
political judgment. Thus science alone is not a sufficient guide to making claims or proposing 
solutions in the green case. 
 
There are three sets of problems here: first, in relation to science’s reliability and sufficiency; 
second, in relation to its alleged industrialist and exploitative nature; and third, in relation to the 
idea of alternative green science. Science is more of a friend to the environment than the points 
made by Yearley and greens outlined above suggest. 
 
1 Unreliable a friend to the environment as science may been, it has been as significant a friend to 
it as an enemy. Scientific discoveries have been basic to the definition of environmental problems 
as problems and to the revival of environmentalism in the 1960s, 1970s and onwards. The 
detection of ozone depletion, climate change, acid rain, the effects of exhaust fumes, pesticides 
and detergent use, to take just some examples, and of the origins of these problems in CFCS, the 
burning of carbon fuels and so on, have depended on scientific discovery. In relation to points (1) 
to (4) in the paragraph above, science is certainly in the very strict sense unreliable. It is partly 
responsible for some environmental problems, can be made to line up in defence of practices 
which will perpetuate them, is fallible and falls short of omniscience and cannot make 
epistemological claims of absolute certainty. Yet, given its role in identifying and solving 
environmental problems, it is as reliable a friend as the environment is likely to get. Furthermore, 
while insufficient in the senses Yearley outlines, it is also essential to the resolution of 
environmental problems. 
 
2 It is right that science has been and is heavily determined by industrialist rationality, particularly 
by market and commercial priorities. However, the problem here is in the economic and political 
circumstances within which the priorities of science are decided and not in the necessary nature of 
scientific procedure itself. Modern science can be put to environmentally friendly uses in the 
context of different criteria and priorities for its operation. The problem with the domination and 
exploitation of nature criticism, meanwhile, is that the characteristics of science that critics point to 
here - measurement, prediction and technical control - can be used to dominate or exploit but not 
necessarily so. In fact, they can be used for quite the opposite - measuring and trying to control 
pollution in order to protect the environment, for example. Furthermore, measurement and 
prediction are separate from technical control. The latter involves a technological use to which 
scientific discovery can be put, given certain economic priorities and political decisions. It is a 
product of wider socio-economic circumstances and of the technological use of science rather 
than of science itself. 
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3 These points suggest that science is not necessarily an enemy of the environment. On the 
contrary, it is an essential part of solutions to environmental problems. This implies that a different 
science would be neither necessary nor desirable. In fact ecological and quantum approaches 
which green science advocates propose as an alternative are problematic. First, they are not holist 
as such advocates propose. Ecology, for example, studies the interrelations between species and 
organisms rather than wholes as above and beyond the parts. Second, this is just as well, 
because if they were holist (as opposed to relational) they would have dangerous implications in 
valuing systems over individuals, as suggested in chapter 3 above. Furthermore, they would be 
flawed as explanations (see chapter 6 below). 
 
Modern science, in short, like environmental groups and the media, has been and is an important 
factor in the identification and publicizing of environmental problems and the growth of the green 
movement, One strength of Yearley’s social problems analysis is that he provides a corrective to 
sociologically determinist nations which focus on economic and industrial change, changes in 
occupational structure or value changes in the revival of environmentalism in the 1970s and 
1980s. He shows how environmental issues do not merely reflect an objective reality or external 
conditions but are shaped into environmental issues by green organizations, the media and 
science. 
 
However, it is important that a focus on the social definition of environmental problems should 
complement rather than be counterposed to explanations based on the objective existence of 
environmental problems and wider economic and social processes involved in their articulation 
into socially defined issues. There are problems with the extent to which Yearley takes his social 
constructionist approach. It is too much, for example, to dismiss the idea that objective problems 
can force their way into public consciousness. His assertion that the correctness of social 
problems claims is comparatively unimportant is too strong. Objective environmental problems are 
what social problems claims appeal and respond to, and environmental explanations are as 
important as social action approaches in showing reasons for the rise of environmental concern 
and the green movement. I will return to environmental explanations for the rise of the green 
movement. But let me look first at cultural and structural explanations. 
 
Cultural explanations: value changes and the post-materialist thesis 
 
There are explanations of the rise of environmentalism based on the role of value changes in 
capitalist liberal democracies. These link with economic explanations because they see value 
change as rooted in economic changes. 
 
The key explanation which focuses on value changes draws on Inglehart's (1971 and 1977) 
analysis of the rise of post-materialist values since the 1950s and 1960s in the Western world. 
Inglelhart’s thesis was proposed in the 1970s following the post-war economic boom, increasing 
state intervention in the provision of welfare rising standards of living in the developed world. 
These developments were coupled with the rise in the late 1960s of social movements concerned 
with civil rights (especially of women and ethnic minorities) participatory democracy and peace 
and of the anti-establishment and anti-materialist student and hippy movements. 
 
The post-materialist argument is that with rising standards of living in the developed world many 
peoples' material wants are being satisfied. Consequently people are becoming more oriented 
towards less acquisitive and non-material goals to do with factors such as quality of life, 
intellectual and spiritual development, political rights, participation and the environment (see 
Cotgrove 1982:chs 2 and 3; Lowe and Rudig 1986:513-18). 
 
There are three critical questions which could be asked about the post-materialist thesis. 
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1 Is the satisfaction of material needs more likely to lead to the creation of new material needs 
than to post-materialism? The post-materialist thesis is based on a fixed idea of basic material 
needs and a hierarchy of 'higher' needs which build on these. This is problematic. What basic 
needs are may be malleable and open to redefinition. In societies with rising standards of living 
increasing material satisfactions may lead to a widening range of things regarded as basic 
material needs rather than a transfer to non-material needs. The evidence of a growing range of 
consumer goods which are deemed to be 'standard' in developed industrial nations (colour TVs, 
videos, computers, microwaves etc.) may suggest this to be an equally plausible thesis about the 
possible consequences of material improvement. 
 
2 Jehlicka (1992:7) casts doubt on the empirical basis of postmaterialism. He argues that evidence 
from a survey of green voters in EC countries shows a diversity of concerns among them, those 
among the German and, to some extent, Dutch populations being the only ones who really fit the 
post-materialist mould well (see also Kreuzer 1990). He suggests, significantly, that the only 
common peculiar green voter concern across the different countries is concern for the 
environment. This suggests the possibility of an environmental rather than a cultural explanation 
for the rise of environmentalism. I will come back to this.  
 
3 Another problem is that there may be reasons other than increasing material satisfaction for the 
rise of post-material values. Inglehart's description of post-materialism as a set of values and 
concerns could be accepted without accepting post-materialisrn as an analysis which locates them 
in material satisfaction (Lowe and Rudig 1986:516-18). Post-materialism could, for example, be 
the result rather than the cause of the rise of new social movements giving high priority to 
post-material issues. Or it may be due to an increased profile for environmental issues in the 
media or education. It could plausibly be the result of a growth in white collar public sector jobs 
which tend to be concerned with social welfare, educational improvement, public health and so on, 
rather than an improvement in the standards of living of people in such professions or others. Or it 
could be a result of economic, social and political changes in society, associated perhaps with 
growth and bureaucratization, which lead to an objective escalation of the environmental and 
political problems post-materialists are concerned with, materialism could be rooted in objective 
problems in the identified in post-material discourse rather than in external economic or social 
changes. Both the original post-materialist and these other possible explanations suggest, 
meanwhile, that it is appropriate to see the basis of values in social or environmental processes 
rather than to see concern or action as deriving from values. Rather than analysing the basis for 
concern or in values, how values are created and shifted through action context of particular 
interests, structural conditions and power relations needs to be analysed (Lowe and Rudig 
1986:537). 
 
Structural explanations: social structure and the 'new middle class' 
 
Two explanations based on changes in social structure are often given for the rise of the green 
movement. One is that reorganization of the social structure in advanced capitalist countries has 
loosened traditional class-based political allegiances. These have been replaced by more 
value-based non-class cleavages and movements. The second is that the rise of 
environmentalism is a product of the growth of the 'new middle class'. 
 
1 Changing class structure and political allegiances. A number of processes are said to have 
contributed to the decomposition of class structure. The division between ownership and control in 
enterprises has split the capitalist class and, together with the growth of the state, led to a large 
managerial white collar middle class, many of whom work in the public sector. The working class 
has become divided by contradictory processes of growing affluence on one hand unemployment 
and immiseration on the other. Increasing post-war social mobility, particularly from the working 
class into the middle-class, has diluted class cohesion and identity. All this is said have shaken up 
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and loosened traditional class identities, consciousness and political alignment. There is a 
decreasing amount of voting on class lines across the board, whether by working-class people for 
left-wing parties or middle-class people for the right, a phenomenon described as 'absolute class 
dealignment' (Heath et al. 1985). 
 
The decline of class economic interest as a basis for political allegiance and loyalty to political 
parties has led people to owe political allegiance more on value or socio-cultural bases and to 
movements other than traditional political parties. This favours the new social movements who do 
not appeal to specific economic interest groups but argue on the basis of universal values and 
offer an alternative to traditional parties. None of this is to say that class interest is no longer 
subjectively relevant or should not be an objective factor on which people act. It is merely to say 
that economic interest and class bases of political allegiance have loosened to the advantage of 
non-economic non-interest-based and non-class movements like the green movement. 
 
2 The New Middle Class. One other possible explanation for the rise of environmentalism in the 
1970s and 1980s is that it is based on the growing significance of a social class group especially 
sensitive to post-materialist environmentalist Issues - the 'new middle class'. The new middle class 
is perceived to have arisen out of changes in occupational structure such as the growth, with the 
division of ownership and control, of managerial occupations and, with the rise of the welfare state 
and the service sector, of public sector white collar employment. Ecology is widely seen as a 
predominantly middle-class issue which only the middle classes have the luxury to be concerned 
with and the green movement is popularly seen as being composed mostly of middle-class 
activists.  
 
There are four main problems with the class values link posited here. There may be a link but it is 
more complicated than it first seems. To get a more accurate picture it is necessary to distinguish 
first between different types of environmental organization, second between different fractions of 
the middle class, third to investigate the direction of causality in the class-values link and fourth to 
look at whether it is in the interest of middle-class people to be environmentally concerned. I will 
come to reasons why middle-class people may be more environmentally concerned when I come 
to the third and fourth points. 
 
1 The middle class-environmentalism link is complicated when the new environmentalism, 
symbolized by groups such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, is distinguished from the 
nature conservationism of groups like the National Trust, the Ramblers' Association and the Royal 
Society for Nature Conservation (see Cotgrove 1982:ch. 1; Yearley 1991:ch. 2; Lowe and Goyder 
1983:pt. 2). 'New' environmentalists tend, for instance, to favour more radical forms of direct action 
than nature conservationists and dismiss the possibility of technocratic fixes, believing in the need 
for fundamental structural change in the economic and social value systems and institutions of the 
developed countries. Nature conservationists tend to be more moderate and defensive on such 
issues and focus on reforms within existing structures. This is not a clear-cut distinction as nature 
conservationists do sometimes use direct action and often are reacting against the broader 
imperatives of industrialization (Cotgrove 1982:11-12), while new environmentalists on the other 
hand do put a lot of work into lobbying for legislative and political reform. However, there is a 
difference of emphasis and in the sorts of environmentalism that different fractions of the middle 
class tend to support.  
 
Survey evidence collected by Cotgrove (1982:19-20) shows slightly higher rates of employment for 
nature conservationists in market than non-market sectors and much higher rates for new 
environmentalists in non-market than market occupations. Furthermore, focusing on the shared 
middle-class background of environmentalists of both groups tends to gloss over differences 
according to age and political ideology between new environmentalism and nature 
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conservationists. New environmentalists are more left-wing and less sympathetic to economic 
individualist ideas than nature conservationists and tend to be younger. 
 
2 Focusing now on new environmentalism brings us to the second complexity mentioned above: 
that it is misleading to see environmentalism as a middle-class issue when it tends to be the 
concern of specific fractions of the middle class with other fractions being amongst its fiercest 
critics. Cotgrove's data show that new environmentalists are concentrated in middle-class 
occupations in the non-market sector especially in service professions in education, social work 
and health. Middle-class workers in industry and the market sector are very likely to be opposed to 
the green movement. Furthermore, the middle-class categorization glosses over differences within 
that class according to other criteria such as political attitudes. The 'new middle class' radical 
environmentalists are critical of market values and hierarchical and non-participative structures 
and are committed to non-material values, on all of which middle-class market sector industrialists 
hold reverse opinions. 
 
All this suggests that the image of the new environmentalist as a sandal-clad social worker is a 
more subtle perception of the complex truth than the simplification that all greens are 'middle 
class'! Thee above points imply that the non-market occupational location of the environmentally 
concerned explains their environmental sympathies, and this brings us to the third point noted 
above on the direction class-values causality. 
 
3 This is a controversial question among sociologists who have often wished to establish the 
social bases of values and political behaviour. However, political sociologists have been less 
confident in recent years in arguing for the class determination of political behaviour because of 
theoretical critiques (see Hindess 1987) and empirical controversies (Heath et al. 1985) on the 
issue. Many analysts suggest that value orientations cannot be read off from objective economic 
interests, that classes do not have clear partisan as opposed to instrumental political commitments 
or that class is only one among many other significant social factors, such as regional location, 
according to which political behaviour can be classified. 
 
Cotgrove (1982:93-7) does seem to suggest that, on the environmental question, peoples' values 
are related to their relationship in their occupation to the marketplace. He argues that new 
middle-class environmentalists work outside the market sector and have 'an everyday 
occupational commitment to non-material goals and values'. This 'is an expression of the interests' 
(p. 95) of people who work outside the dominant institutions of capitalist societies where decisions 
are made according to economic rather than non-material values. Workers in the productive 
market sectors, however, have an everyday commitment to market economic values and the 
non-material values of environmentalism are alien to them. 
 
However, Cotgrove (pp. 44-5) is sceptical about the idea that peoples' occupational role 
determines their value orientation. On the basis of further survey evidence he proposes that 
people tend to choose their occupation on the basis of their already existing value commitments 
rather than vice versa. Post-materialists tend to choose occupations involving working with people, 
achieving, non-material satisfactions, self-expression and intrinsic rewards. Materialists tend to 
choose jobs offering status, security, money and extrinsic rewards. Values influence choice of 
occupation rather than the other way round. On the other hand this still leaves open the question 
of the circumstances in which people gain the values which influence their occupational choice. 
This could plausibly be related to home background and so leaves room for a class explanation. 
 
4 A fourth problem with explanations of environmentalism as a middle-class movement rests on 
the motivation often imputed to middle-class people for being environmentally concerned. It is 
argued that support for new social movements is an attempt by a credentialled yet politically 
excluded and relatively economically disadvantaged group to achieve political clout (Scott 
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1990:138-9). Or the new middle class are seen to have an interest in environmental protection 
because it involves expanding the state regulatory apparatus in which they are heavily involved. 
There will be more jobs for their and they can accumulate greater powers for themselves out of 
intervention to protect the environment. The ecology movement is an instrument for self-interested 
state personnel to use to their advantage (Whelan 1989). 
 
However, it is difficult to see a basis for economic interest in middle-class concern for the 
environment. Radical environmentalism argues for slowing down growth and rates of 
consumption. A comfortable group, yet one which perceives itself to be materially disadvantaged 
relative to otherwise comparable groups, would not be likely to perceive cuts in growth as in its 
interest. This is even more the case when it is considered that the expansion of the state in the 
post-war period has been financed by growth and would suffer from its running down. Material 
disadvantage and political exclusion may lead the middle class to oppositional, critical and 
post-material values arising out of social experience. But such values do not seem to offer much in 
their content to the objective interest of this group. Furthermore, environmental problems have a 
universal effect and, if anything probably affect the working and living conditions of working-class 
groups more than the middle class. Class is an economic category based on shared objective 
economic interest. Yet middle-class class concern for the environment seems to be based more 
on values and socio-cultural factors. Without an explanation based on material interests, 
middle-class concern for the environment seems less of a class explanation. It may be 
class-based but does not seem to be class-driven (see Lowe and Rudig 1986:522-4; Yearley 
1991:81-2; Crook et 1992:145-6). 
 
So there does appear to be a link between membership of the new middle-class and concern for 
the environment but it may be susceptibility to environmental concerns which determines 
occupational position rather than vice versa. Occupational position reinforces already existing 
value orientations. The growth of new middle-class occupations may have been important for the 
consolidation and strengthening of 1970s and 1980s environmentalism but perhaps not a key 
factor in its rise. 
 
This still leaves partially open the question of the social bases of the revival of environmental 
concern in the 1970s and 1980s. If the growth of new middle-class occupations only partially 
explains this, then there is space for a post-materialist theory based on the significance of 
post-war rising standards of living and a political sociology of interest group articulation of green 
issues. It also leads us to the most obvious explanation yet that most poorly considered in the 




I have already questioned Yearley's (1991) argument that objective problems are comparatively 
unimportant to sociological analyses of the rise of environmentalism. Yearley himself recognizes 
the problems with such a view when he suggests that post-materialist arguments: 
 
‘tend to overlook two things: the specifically environmental 
aspects of green attitudes and the particular events (and their 
social and political contexts) which prompt people to take an 
interest in green issues ... there are specific stimuli to ecological 
protest’. 
 
Among these Yearley (1991:82) lists Chernobyl, food scares and the Exxon Valdez Alaska oil spill 
as examples. An environmentalist disposition is in part a result of 'particular, personal responses 
to environmental threats and problems'. There are 'certain types of development which frequently 
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lead to collective responses' (p. 83), the building of nuclear power plants being an example (pp. 
82-7), 
 
One problem of theories discussed so far is that they play down or gloss over the 'objective' roots 
of environmentalism. Environmentalism is a product of the work of green interest groups, the 
media or scientists, further facilitated by factors such as rising standards of living which may free 
some people to worry about non-material matters, and the growth of occupational groupings 
susceptible to environmental concerns. But environmental consciousness is also related to 
objective problems which are its stated concern and not just to external social causes. 
 
Explanations of environmentalism can be too sociological. They explain environmentalism in terms 
of external social factors, but they too often exclude problems identified in the content of its 
discourse from having a bearing on the explanation of its rise. In reducing environmentalism to 
social causes they deny the validity of the content of environmentalist discourse. It is reasonable 
to suggest that there might have been an escalation of objective problems in industrial societies of 
the sort identified by greens (resource depletion, traffic fumes, global warming, ozone depletion) 
which, defined and articulated within a particular political, economic and social milieu, are part of 
the explanation for the rise of environmental concern. 
 
Environmentalism should be seen not just as a reaction to a set of secondary political, economic 
and social changes but also to objective problems to which it actually addresses itself. It is the 
experience of environmental problems which concern environments and without which it would be 
difficult for them to define problems as existing or arouse popular concern over them. 
 
Cotgrove (1982) points out that without alternative value systems capable of interpreting 
environmental costs as a problem and formulating alternative criteria of evaluation according to 
environmental rather than economic goals, such problems would never become articulated as 
such. But equally it is the objective existence of the social and environmental costs that allows 
such an articulation and underlies the growth of the green movement. 
 
Tester's (1991) analysis of animal rights discourse provides an example of the way in which the 
objective basis of environmentalism in problems in the environment can be sociologized away by 
an attempt to explain it in terms of its social causes. Tester's book novel in the animal rights 
literature in that it is a historical sociology of animal rights as a discourse rather than an argument 
within animal rights philosophy itself. In sociology it is novel in paying attention to the non-human 
world. Its problem is that it does so by focusing on human discourses about that world, denying 
the content of those discourses and reducing them to their social function. 
 
Tester's argument is that animal rights is all about humans rather than animals. He proposes that 
animal rights discourses give rights to animals on the basis that they have a common sentient or 
organic structure to humans or are of equal value to us or members of same community. Yet it 
sets up humans as the agents of moral concern and animals as the objects of it. In this way animal 
rights, far from being about animals, functions to establish humans' distance and distinctiveness 
from them. It is about humans defining themselves as superior and moral beings. 
 
Tester stretches social constructionism too far here, reducing animal rights to human self-concern 
and morally relativizing it. He argues that the protagonists of animal rights are concerned more 
with self-hood and human perfectionism than animals. Their theories are about some humans 
defining themselves as different as moral agents from non-moral humans and from the objects of 
their concern, animals. Yet in the determination to lay out the functions of animal rights for humans 
here Tester sociologizes away the concern for animals its content. He denies the stated and 
objective basis for moral concern. 
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Furthermore, Tester argues that modern animal rights discourses involve different rather than 
better classifications of animals to those previously existing. However, the jump from historical 
relativity here to epistemological and ethical relativism is too big. Modern classifications of animals 
can be a historical and social product but still be more sensitive to the objective sentient 
experiences of animals than previous classifications and so amenable to a superior ethical attitude 
to them. Tester slips from history to ethics here and once again in locating animal rights in social 
classifications misses out its basis in the objective experience of animals. Animal rights is certainly 
a product of how we think about animals but this is in part related to the experience that animals 
objectively have and not just a product of mental or social constructs. Sociology has the chance in 
its encounters with the non-human world to be more naturalistic and objectivist and less socially 
reductionist in its understandings. Tester misses the chance here. I return to his analysis in 
chapter 6. 
 
One suggestion is that environmental concern is a response to the experience of loss of control 
over our surroundings as a result of new ecological difficulties which cannot be solved through 
normal processes of problem solving. There is an objective and natural basis to environmental 
concern (Lowe and Rudig 1986:517). In a review of the sociological literature on 
environmentalism, Lowe and Rudig are worried about the tendency of sociological explanations to 
divorce environmental concern from ecological problems (p. 518). Environmental concern is too 
often seen as resulting from a shift in values related to social rather than environmental causes, as 
a social symptom or pathology rather than a response to the problems it identifies itself. For Lowe 
and Rudig 'the relation between environmental problems and environmental attitudes is ... one of 
the major research topics which has not been adequately addressed.' They argue for more studies 
of local responses to problems. Social scientists show 'an ignorance of, or an unwillingness to 
consider the role of environmental problems and the particular way in which they have been 
perceived and politicised in different countries' (p. 536). 
 
Sociological analysis should incorporate natural environmental factors in order to get a full and 
complete understanding of the rise of the green movement: 
 
‘the stimuli for environmental action and their causes should he 
analysed. There would be no environmental problems and no green 
parties without the existence of environmental problems. This rather 
trivial point seems to have been forgotten in the literature. (p. 536) 
 
Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990 and 1991) talk about modern societies as characterized by global 
risks and ecological degradation. We rely on science to understand environmental problems yet 
are increasingly sceptical about it and see it as part of the problem. The enormity of the risk and its 
inaccessibility to general understanding lead to anxiety and insecurity. Ecological anxiety is, in 
short, linked through the mediation of science to objective global risks and environmental 
problems themselves. 
 
Jehllcka (1992) cites attitude surveys which suggest that it is general concern rather than NIMBY 
(not in my back yard) self-interest which is at the root of environmental anxiety (see Rudig et al. 
1991). But he agrees that environmentalism is as much a response to environmental problems as 
a social pathology. He cites variability in explanations for green concern in different countries 
noting that concern for the environment is the only common denominator. Beyond Germany, post-
materialist values are less prevalent and environmental concern more of a response to ecological 
conditions (1992:7). He suggests that the British are less concerned about global environmental 
problem because acid rain and river pollution are less prevalent in Britain than elsewhere. 
Countries in Western Europe where air pollution, acidification, deforestation, soil erosion and river 
pollution are most serious - southern Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, northern 
France and Switzerland - are where mature (globally concerned rather than self-interested) 
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environmental concern is most developed (pp 11, 18). Environmentalism is more moderate and 
absorbed into mainstream politics in areas like Britain and Scandinavia where, among other 
things, environmental deterioration is less marked. In the Czech Republic, he argues, 
environmental problems and votes for the green party are linked. The most environmentally 
affected areas record the highest votes for the greens (pp. 15-16; Jehlicka and Kostelecky 1991). 
 
All of this suggests that even in a traditional area of sociological analysis - the study of the bases 
of political values and movement, full and complete understanding requires the inclusion of natural 
environmental factors and society-nature interactions within thee sociological rubric. 
 
Explaining the green movement 
 
Some of the discussion so far has suggested that there are locally or nationally specific 
explanations for differences in the preponderance of green values and Politics. The degree of 
environmental concern, support for green parties and green party success varies. This is 
surprising as there is variation in many of the conditions which lie at the basis of environmental 
concern and green politics: political closure or opennness, environmental group activism and the 
existence of environmental problems themselves, for example. Assuming a comparative 
framework, there are a number of possible explanations for environmental concern and political 
activity. The first four correspond respectively to the political, action, cultural and structural frames 
for the general analysis of social movement formation which I outlined in table 4.1 The last adds a 
fifth category of explanation based on objective environmental problems themselves. 
 
1 Openness or closure of political institutions. Political institutions which are more open to 
environmental lobbying may incorporate environmental concern into mainstream politics and 
disarm green social movement activity. Corporatist closure, on the other hand, may exclude 
environmental concern and so contribute to its channeling into radical and oppositional social 
movement action. Some forms of electoral system - PR party lists, for example - make it easier for 
green parties to get elected and gain prominence and develop. Others - first-past-the-post for 
instance - are obstructive to green party success. These factors, however, explain the political 
direction green concern takes. They do not completely explain why it arises in the first place. For 
this other explanations need to be included. 
 
2 Environmental groups, media and science. The role of environmental groups mobilizing 
resources and pursuing political change and publicity effectively is important to the acceptance of 
environmental degradation as a problem on the public agenda. Their adaptability to the media and 
the interest of the media in the environment as newsworthy as well as the work of scientists in 
identifying environmental problems, their causes and solutions are also important.  
 
3 Values. The preponderance of value dispositions favourable to environmental concern and of 
economic and social circumstances favourable to such values helps the green case. However, 
these values are not produced in a vacuum but are located in material social actions and 
experiences which support and give rise to them. Such material bases might be social and 
environmental. 
 
4 The new middle class. The availability of groups in society with a material existence conducive 
to concern for post-material and environmental concerns provides a social basis for such 
concerns. The existence of such groups may not produce environmental concern but can provide 
a home for it. 
 
5 Environmental explanations. Another material basis for environmental concern is in 
environmental problems themselves. Environmental concern may vary according to the 
experience environmental problems and no full and complete explanation of the rise of green 
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values and politics can be adequate without account of the environmental problems they identify in 
the content of their discourse. Sociology needs to break with anti-naturalism and include natural 
environmental factors and society-nature interactions if it is to give an adequate account of the rise 
of environmentalism. Social constructionism, which reduces environmental problems to social 
symptoms, misses the chance to do this. 
 
How do these categories interact to explain the development of green movements? An 
explanation of the development of environmentalism needs to go back to material experience. It is 
on the basis of experience of environmental problems that a concern about them is developed. For 
it to be developed and popularized requires the identification of such problems (by science) and 
the successful and effective mobilisation of resources (by environmental groups) in pursuit of 
environmental concern. Such groups and values form and develop within a particular social, 
economic, political and cultural context. The availability of social groups with a material existence 
conducive to environmental concern and of propitious economic conditions and value concerns 
affect the degree of receptivity to green values. Environmental concerns also develop within the 
context of sets of power relations. The closure or openness of political parties and institutions, 
example, may affect the direction in which environmental concern is channelled politically. 
 
I have looked in the previous chapter and this one at the philosophical bases of environmentalism 
and reasons for its rise in popularity. I will look in the next couple of chapters at the implications of 
environmentalism for traditional political and social theory. 
 
Guide to further reading 
 
Lowe and Rudig are leading environmental sociologists and their trend report on 'Political Ecology 
and the Social Sciences' (1986) provides a useful review of the literature. They are critical of post-
materialist explanations and stress the importance of political, comparative and environmental 
factors. Stephen Cotgrove's Catastrophe or Cornucopia (1982) covers many explanations 
including post-materialism and the middle-class issue. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of Yearley’s The Green 
Case (1991) take a social problems approach to the role of green groups and the media in 
popularizing environmentalism but question the role of science. Eyerman and Jamison provide an 
'action' explanation in their Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach (1991). This book arose out 
of the Jamison et al.’s comparative study The Making of the New Environmental Consciousness 
(1990). Chapter 5 of Crook et al.'s Postmodernization (1992) accessibly and succinctly analyses 
the rise of social movements and new politics from a point of view influenced by postmodern ideas 
about shifts in the structures of late capitalist societies. Alan Scott's Ideology and the New Social 
Movements (1990) provides a 'political' explanation which plays down the newness of the new 
social movements and tends to give succour to 'realists' rather than 'fundamentalists' in the green 
movement. 
